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I. OUTSIDERS INSIDE
A discussion that examines the law’s relationship to transgender,
intersex, and gender variant people fits very well with this year’s LatCrit
theme, “Outsiders Inside.” 1 A discussion that uses a critical gender lens to
build a strategy for American policy-making for gender justice fits even
better. I want to introduce and contribute to the “transformative gender
law” discussion, which, I believe, embodies the spirit of this year’s
conference theme as well as our panel’s theme, “New Ideas in Sexuality
*
Richael Faithful is a third-year law student at the American University Washington
College of Law. She is also a former board member at Equality Virginia and
community organizer at the Virginia Organizing Project. She would like to thank
Professor Mary Fan for her guidance during the beginning stages of this paper.
1. I use the term “gender variant people” to describe individuals who make gender
non-conforming choices that affect their way of being. It is intended to be expansive,
including the many transgender and intersex identities, as well as individuals who are
without a gendered identity but challenge traditional gender norms. Gender Education
& Advocacy Inc. provides a useful gender variance model and guidance. See GENDER
EDUC.
&
ADVOCACY,
INC.,
GENDER
VARIANCE
MODEL,
http://www.gender.org/resources/dge/gea02006.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2010);
GENDER EDUC. & ADVOCACY, INC., GUIDE TO USING THE GENDER VARIANCE MODEL
(2001), http://www.gender.org/resources/dge/gea02007.pdf. For background about the
unique challenges that intersex people face, see also Erin Lloyd, Intersex Education,
Advocacy & The Law: The Struggle for Recognition and Protection, 11 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 283 (2005).
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and Gender Law.”
This lively discussion among feminist/queer advocates and critical
scholars examines two fundamental questions about law and society: what
is gender, and how is the current legal regime responsive to gender? A
small but growing minority, including myself, believes that the “formal
equality” legal regime has become incoherent and that we ought to
proactively construct an alternative that better delivers justice in a new civil
rights era.
II. CONTEXT FOR THE TRANSFORMATIVE GENDER LAW DISCUSSION
The transformative gender law discussion centers on gender outlaws.
Gender outlaws are individuals who break social expectations about how to
exist as a man or a woman.2 Interestingly, no one conforms to the plethora
of existing gender norms all of the time, and yet, in due course, its
recursive nature actually facilitates non-conformity.3 It is this tight
tension—even contradiction—between permissible and impermissible
deviation that inspires gender outsiders to analogize gender to
performance.4
Performance theory explains gender as the expression of a set of
assigned characteristics, designated feminine or masculine, which define
“female” or “male” performance. The unity of a person’s performative
experience constructs our “male” or “female” identities.5
Some
individuals, however, refuse their assigned roles or go off-script, choosing
instead to play outside of their “intelligible” performance.6 Performance
theory, originally conceived as a feminist theory, animates many social
theories today on gender, including critical gender legal studies.
Some critical gender theorists have confronted the “formal equality”
2. See generally KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE
REST OF US (1994) (coining the term “gender outlaw”).
3. See JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 42 (2004) [hereinafter UNDOING
GENDER] (arguing that “[t]o assume that gender always and exclusively means the
matrix of the ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ is precisely to miss the critical point that the
production of that coherent binary is contingent, that it comes at a cost, and that those
permutations of gender which do not fit the binary are as much a part of gender as its
most normative instance”).
4. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 1-3 (1990) [hereinafter GENDER TROUBLE] (positing that the
“subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms”).
5. See id. at 22 (explaining that “[g]ender can denote a unity of experience, of sex,
gender, and desire, only when sex can be understood in some sense to necessitate
gender—where gender is a psychic and/or cultural designation of the self—and
desire—where desire is heterosexual and therefore differentiates itself through
oppositional relation to that other gender it desires”).
6. See id. at 23 (offering “Herculine” as a “sexual impossibility of identity” and an
example of going “off-script”).
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model’s inability to serve transgender justice based on modern gender
frameworks like performance theory.7 Of interest are the unique equal
protection issues raised by recent transgender cases. Some transgender
litigants have brought successful sex-based workplace discrimination
claims.8 Critical scholars argue, however, that this rubric excludes those
litigants who are unwilling to choose a female/male identity or those who
face discrimination that is not fully captured by inequity principles.9 Most
recently, practitioner Andrew Gilden persuasively argued that a
“transgender class” or “gender identity/expression class” are inadequate
because they rely on a narrow, identity-based model.10 I am convinced that
a “formal equality” regime cannot exist without gender regulation, which I
define as institutionally-enforced normative understandings of a binary
gender scheme.11 Gender regulation curtails personal freedom and thus
impairs equal opportunity to freely live as one wishes. For that reason, we
must consider what lies beyond the formal equality regime because what
exists on the other side is what critical scholar Taylor Flynn calls “the
opportunity of more.”12
There are three vital questions driving the gender transformative law
discussion today.
First, how do we understand dynamic gender
performance when the law enters the stage? Second, how do we address
ethical concerns when gender outlaws are real characters? Finally, how do
we begin to shape the law to fairly respond to complex ways of existing?
We have reached a pivotal point in gender legal theory because certain
tensions threaten to break the formal equality regime in the not-so-distant
7. See Dean Spade, Keynote Address: Trans Law Reform Strategies: Co-optation,
and the Potential for Transformative Change, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 288, 297
(2009) (arguing that the effects of a “formal equality” model will be minimal because
those who really need protection will not be afforded protection, for example a
transgender individual, with merely a legal name change).
8. See, e.g., L. Camille Hébert, Transforming Transsexual and Transgender
Rights, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 535, 537 (2009) (offering identity
discrimination and sex discrimination in the form of sex stereotyping as legal theories
that have proven successful in the past).
9. See Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of
Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 102-03 (2008)
(questioning a district court judge’s decision to apply Title VII because the plaintiff did
conform to the defendant’s stereotypes about gender).
10. See id. at 103-04 (describing how some courts define “real” transgender
individuals as those who have had multiple medical interventions and engage in
heterosexual intercourse).
11. See UNDOING GENDER, supra note 3, at 42 (explaining that norms themselves
are benign but carry with them an “intelligibility” that imposes legitimate and
illegitimate parameters around behaviors).
12. See Taylor Flynn, Instant (Gender) Messaging: Expression-Based Challenges
to State Enforcement of Gender Norms, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 465, 467-68
(2009) (arguing that equality claims rest on a restrictive medical model that excludes
non-medicalized claims by trans-people).
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future. As gender variation becomes increasingly visible, gender regulation
is stronger than ever. As non-discrimination laws begin to reflect our new
gender ideologies, criminal laws continue to tightly control gender
expression. I evaluate these tensions in an effort to continue encouraging
gender law’s re-imagination among activists, advocates, and scholars alike.
This article emphasizes two points. First, the formal equality model
should be viewed as a transitory one that will soon reach its utilitarian
ceiling. Its inherent essentialism contains fatal discursive and ethical
problems. Second, theoretical principles should move away from heavy
criticism and move toward an affirmative vision. I imagine a local lawmaking strategy that shifts from equality principles to nexus principles.13 I
hope that these points begin to outline a competing vision for
transformative gender law.
III. BREAKING GENDER: GENDER PERFORMANCE AND NONDISCRIMINATION LAW
How do we understand dynamic gender performance when the law enters
the stage?
Gender exists in ways other than the embodiment of two extremes:
masculinity and femininity.14 The basis upon which we impose these
extremes is so tenuous that severe regulation is necessary to ensure
conformity.15 The threat of non-conformity grows to be so significant that
gender compliance requires something more—state coercion.16 State
13. I use the term “nexus principles” to describe a constellation of values that
emphasize individual capability rather than group membership. See Martha Albertson
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 16 (2008) (explaining that multiple identities do not create
(dis)advantage but rather systems of power and privilege interact to create a web of
(dis)advantage). In this sense, the object of legal consideration would shift from the
formal equality regime’s membership basis to a capability basis that analyzes unfair
treatment in the context of whether a capable person was denied opportunity for
reasons other than one’s ability.
14. See GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 4, at 22-23 (suggesting that compulsive
heterosexuality creates gender polarity, which may also produce compulsive
heterosexuality, but nonetheless, demonstrates that gender is relationally produced, and
conceivably, may exist in other ways as relationships change).
15. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) (claiming that
anti-discrimination law assumes sexual difference and that the state has played a role in
enforcing this difference by never challenging this assumption). But see UNDOING
GENDER, supra note 3, at 41 (stating that gender as well as other social and cultural
norms may be subject to “larger regulatory operation of power”).
16. See Flynn, supra note 12, at 467 (emphasizing that “[n]ot only does the state
have sole authority to legally categorize people by sex, but it also uses those categories
as the basis for distributing rights and goods, such as marriage and its associated
benefits, over which it maintains a monopoly of power”) (emphasis added).
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coercion entails mandates to declare one gender or another on state
documentation;17 gender-specific public accommodations;18 and access to
civil institutions based on gendered relationships, like marriage.19
Perhaps gender regulation is more evident in the denial of equal
protection. Gender variant people are fired from jobs, refused housing, and
denied safe healthcare with increased visibility.20 Such discrimination is
invidious, even under basic formal equality principles. U.S. activists have
responded by successfully revising state and local non-discrimination laws
across the country to include “gender identity” and “gender expression” in
their enumerated protections.21 Thirteen states, the District of Columbia,
and 108 cities and counties prohibit discrimination based on gender identity
and gender expression.22 This inclusion of “gender expression” both
informs the transformative gender law discussion and reveals the
limitations of formal equality.
Non-discrimination laws, premised on the formal equality model,
17. See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 731, 734 (2008)
(explaining that there is no clear legal gender for transgender people under the existing
administrative matrix for gender identification and that this binary matrix poses a
particular problem for transgender people that are in the process of reclassifying their
gender).
18. See Diana Elkind, Comment, The Constitutional Implications of Bathroom
Access Based on Gender Identity: An Examination of Recent Developments Paving the
Way for the Next Frontier of Equal Protection, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 921 (2007)
(describing how trans-people face pervasive discrimination, such as discriminatory
bathroom access: “which bathroom to use is a fundamental and unnecessarily
complicated choice that highlights the discord between the transgender individual’s
personal identity and society’s label of what is acceptable”).
19. See Franklin H. Romeo, Note, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New
Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 719-20
(2005) (noting that courts have used the “dimorphic” gender system to invalidate
transgender marriages); see also Abigail Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are
Transgendered People Strangers to the Law?, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150,
169 (2005) (analyzing a spousal probate case involving a transgender person in which
the court challenged the basis of the legitimacy of the marriage).
20. See, e.g., Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The
Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM.
& MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 37, 37-38 (2000) (arguing that transgender discrimination
is no different from basic sex discrimination).
21. See Transgender Law & Policy Inst., U.S. Jurisdictions with Laws Prohibiting
Discrimination
on
the
Basis
of
Gender
Identity
or
Expression,
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm#jurisdictions (last visited Feb. 12,
2010) [hereinafter U.S. Jurisdictions] (listing the jurisdictions, that prohibit
discrimination based on gender identity or gender expression); see also Jesse Hooley,
Normalising Transgender and Policing Transgression: Anti-Discrimination Law
Reform Ten Years On, 25 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 79, 79 (2006) (analyzing the political
process required for the production of a transgender bill, including anti-discrimination
statues, in New South Wales); Heike Polster, Gender Identity as a New Prohibited
Ground of Discrimination, 1 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 157, 189 (2003) (citing Australian,
Canadian, and European laws to show that trans non-discrimination inclusion is an
international trend).
22. U.S. Jurisdictions, supra note 21.
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enumerate specific characteristics in facially neutral language. Neutral
construction formally offers universal protection. Neutrality can also
protect against discrimination based on a perceived characteristic.23 When
advocates think about non-discrimination laws, they read classes into the
characteristics, so that identity groups, like transgender people, are buffered
from unfair treatment.
What, then, do advocates make of the concept of gender expression? It
is distinct from gender because expression describes a behavior, not an
immutable characteristic, yet activists pushed for its inclusion in nondiscrimination laws. They did so because they sought protection from all
gendered discrimination. A woman who wears men’s clothes, for instance,
is protected under gender expression if the harm she suffers is due to her
lack of feminine conformity, regardless of her identity. This combination
of “gender identity and expression” addresses something beyond
transgender identity and speaks to the immanence of gender regulation.
The inclusion of both terms indicates that gender regulation governs both
gendered identity as well as gendered behavior.
Further, gender expression is a theoretically powerful element when
gender is understood as a hyper-regulated identity.24 If gender expression
is seen as an exception, it begs the question whether other gender
regulation prototypes can inform our future non-discrimination lawmaking? To explore this idea further, we turn to another area: criminal
law.
IV. LAW-BREAKING GENDER: GENDER REGULATION AS CRIMINALIZATION
How do we address ethical concerns when “gender outlaws” are real
characters?
The United States’ criminal justice system exerts a substantial amount of
state-enforced gender regulation.25 Criminal gender regulation is in fact so
23. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2 (West 2009) (defining “sexual orientation
[as] heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality, whether actual or perceived” and
“gender identity [as] a person’s self-perception, or perception of that person by another,
of the person’s identity as a male or female based upon the person’s appearance[,] . . .
physical characteristics[,] . . . anatomy, . . . or sex at birth”).
24. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §4553(9-C) (2008) (defining “sexual
orientation” as a person’s “gender identity or expression”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7
(West 2009) (making it unlawful to discriminate against a person based on the person’s
sexual orientation or gender identity); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030 (2009) (establishing
that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation).
25. See Kylar W. Broadus, The Criminal Justice System and Trans People, 18
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 561, 561-65 (2009) (describing systemic factors that
contribute to increased trans exposure to the criminal justice system); see also Aeyal
Gross, Gender Outlaws Before the Law: The Courts of the Borderland, 32 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 165, 166 (2009) (examining five “gender fraud” criminal cases of trans-men
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pervasive that it is tantamount to criminalization.26 Gender variant and
transgender criminalization instructs urgency in the creation of real
protections, exposes the limitations of identity-based protections, and
highlights the re-orientation necessary to anchor a future gender legal
model.
Gender outlaws—faeries, dommes, punks, butches, and trannies, among
others—have long-resisted criminal gender regulation, particularly among
urban, poor, and communities of color. Gender outlaws resist when they
endure police brutality, when they develop their own survival techniques,
and when they organize.27 Some have even cautioned gay and lesbian
activists that legal rights cannot, and should not, be sexual, and genderrights activists’ should not make that their primary goal.28 On the other
hand, some acknowledge that there is at least the potential for expanded
rights, which in turn, may put affected communities in a better position to
demand greater protection under the law.
Another part of our re-imaginative task is to examine how a re-directed
gender-justice strategy can strengthen protective laws so they are more
effective. 29 We must deliver justice to gender outlaws’ most marginalized
experiences. A handful of studies have documented gender outlaw realities
in several major cities, including New York, Washington D.C., and San
Francisco. We cannot glean much from these data, but what we do know is
simply devastating.
In San Francisco, half of respondents reported employment
discrimination, with sixty-four percent of respondents hovering around the
poverty line, earning less than $25,000 a year.30 Nearly a third of
respondents reported housing discrimination.31 Close to half of the pool
who in some instances received imprisonment for their convictions).
26. See Broadus, supra note 25, at 565-66 (portraying how transgendered people
face some of the same systemic, abusive discrimination that people of color have faced
since the time of Jim Crow segregation).
27. See Pooja Gehi, Symposium Presentation: Struggles from the Margins: AntiImmigrant Legislation and the Impact on Low-Income Transgender People of Color,
30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 315, 325-27 (2009) (describing how low-income
transgendered people are often forced to commit “survival crimes” because of “poverty
exacerbated by discrimination”).
28. See, e.g., Pauline Park, GenderPAC, The Transgender Rights Movement and
the Perils of a Post-Identity Politics Paradigm, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 747, 756-57
(2003) (criticizing GenderPAC’s advocacy for non-identity gender rights).
29. See Dean Spade, Keynote Address: Trans Law & Politics on a Neoliberal
Landscape, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353, 356-357 (2009) (observing that
non-discrimination laws have not rooted out systemic bias against different racial,
gender, and national origin groups).
30. SHANNON MINTER & CHRISTOPHER DALEY, TRANS-REALITIES: A LEGAL NEEDS
ASSESSMENT OF SAN FRANCISCO’S TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES 12 (2003).
31. See id. at 16 (reporting that thirty-two percent of the pool experienced housing
discrimination).
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reported healthcare discrimination as a high priority area, and almost onethird reported experiencing discrimination in accessing healthcare.32
The leading Washington, D.C. study found that forty percent of
transgendered residents who completed the survey had not finished high
school, thirty-one percent earned less than $10,000 a year, and another
twenty-nine percent had no source of income.33 One-fourth of respondents
were HIV-positive, and twenty-two percent did not know their HIV
status.34 While seventy-five percent reported feeling safe in their living
space, thirteen percent felt unsafe, citing the most common barriers to
obtaining adequate housing as lack of income, employment, and
estrangement from their birth-families.35 Ninety-four percent of the
respondents to the D.C. survey were people of color.36
Finally, the Sylvia Rivera Law Project (“SRLP”) report on transgender,
intersex, and gender variant inmates offers an incisive criminalization
critique, detailing how discrimination, poverty, and exposure to high-risk
factors culminate into police interaction and incarceration.37 I distill their
analysis into two areas: ancillary criminalization and systemic
criminalization.
Ancillary criminalization describes “public safety” laws and how their
unfair enforcement negatively affects gender variant people. Let me offer
three common scenarios: a female-appearing person of color who is
walking home at night endures police harassment due to a suspicion that
this person is engaging in sex-work; a queer, homeless, young person is
threatened with arrest for trespassing when this person is at a public park; a
transgender man, without adequate access to healthcare, is at risk for drug
charges for seeking off-the-market hormone therapy supplies. These
scenarios demonstrate that although some “public safety” laws do not
expressly target gender variant people, they are disproportionately harmed,
even targeted, in the enforcement of such laws.
Systemic criminalization is a well-known phenomenon within
32. See id. at 14 (emphasizing that access to quality healthcare has been an
important issue in the transgender population).
33. See JESSICA XAVIER & RON SIMMONS, THE WASHINGTON TRANSGENDER NEEDS
ASSESSMENT SURVEY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2000), http://www.transhealth.
transadvocacy.org/Needs_Assessments/DC.doc (providing the first quantitative report
of the health and housing needs among transgendered people living in the District of
Columbia).
34. See id. at 2 (stating that an additional eighteen percent have never been tested
for HIV).
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 1.
37. See SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, IT’S WAR IN HERE: A REPORT ON THE
TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PEOPLE IN NEW YORK STATE MEN’S
PRISONS 13-16 (2007) [hereinafter IT’S WAR IN HERE].
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marginalized communities in which biased laws, enforcement, institutions,
and customs compound to have adverse effects. The SRLP report contains
an authoritative description of systemic criminalization. Its analysis into
transgender and intersex prison experiences begins with the ways in which
structural forces reinforce one another to push many gender variant people
into circumstances where fewer beneficial, lawful choices exist.38 Extreme
social marginalization leads to high-risk conditions and high-stakes
choices, which for some, inevitably lead to severely diminished life
chances.
The SLRP report essentially illustrates a school-to-prison pipeline for
poor, gender variant people of color.39 Early home displacement, bullyinduced school drop-out, endemic (legally permissible) work and housing
discrimination, and rampant institutional abuse can be traced as root causes
of survival crime.40 Moreover, institutional abuses, such as racial profiling
and judicial officer trans-phobia, also increase transgender and intersex
incarceration rates.41 If poor people, people of color, non-English speaking
people, disabled people, and other people with non-normative ways are
branded as common criminals, then, gender non-conforming people—who
often overlap into these categories—are widely advertised as “outlaws.”
Here, we face another tension that informs our transformative gender law
analysis: is it possible for literally visible “criminals” to be “invisible”
under criminal law?
I call this queer contradiction the “punishment paradox.”42 The
punishment paradox connects two oft-discussed observations. On one
hand, affected people, activists, and advocates are seeing the realities of
systemic criminalization in urban areas at increasingly higher volume; on
the other hand, legal gender scholars are commenting on how gender
variance is ignored or at times, muted, in the law. Criminal law, in

38. See id. at 9 (stating that: “Discrimination against transgender people in housing,
employment, healthcare, education, public benefits, and social services is pervasive,
pushing transgender people to the margins of the formal economy. With few other
options, many low-income and poor transgender people engage in criminalized means
of making a living, such as sex work.”).
39. See id. (observing that the school-to-prison pipeline is a pattern experienced by
other marginalized groups, particularly black men, and that in some states, prison
population projections are based on the school drop-out rate for this group). See
generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSISSIPPI, MISSING THE MARK:
ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS IN THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI (2009), http://www.aclu.org
/files/pdfs/racialjustice/missingthemark_report.pdf.
40. IT’S WAR IN HERE, supra note 37, at 15-17.
41. Id.
42. This idea is similar to the hyper-visibility/invisibility dynamic that affects many
marginalized communities, particularly in the United States. See Alisa Bierria et al., To
Render Ourselves Visible: Women of Color Organizing and Hurricane Katrina, in
WHAT LIES BENEATH: KATRINA, RACE, AND THE STATE OF THE NATION 31 (2007).
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particular, is acutely confronting the rigidity of a binary gender
construction as increasing numbers of gender variant people enter jails and
prisons.43 The natural question, then, is how can criminal law punish
individuals who do not exist in the eyes of the law? Or alternatively, how
do non-existent people experience criminalization?
The punishment paradox represents a total gender regulatory scheme. In
the same way that groups—not individuals—are heavily burdened by
criminal laws, unpopular behavior—not necessarily harmful behavior—can
be subject to criminal regulation. Based on the premise that gender variant
people are engaging in “wrongful behavior,” they are pushed to the social
and economic margins, they are denied legal remedies to which they are
entitled, and even worse, they are either directly or derivatively targeted by
criminal laws. The punishment paradox shows that the primary theoretical
issue that the transformative gender law discussion must address is not
merely how law can undermine the gender binary, but how it can provide a
blueprint for dismantling the entire gender regulatory scheme.
The ethical dimensions of a binary orientation become clear when
theorists forget that our laws affect real people, especially people who have
urgent survival needs such as employment, housing, and healthcare. They
deserve the right to exist, at the very least, free from scrutiny, harassment,
or punishment from other people, as well as state actors. Beyond the right
to exist, gender variant people also deserve a positive entitlement to live
with dignity and esteem. Most gender scholars have abrogated their ethical
imperative to evaluate fully the impact of our proposals on marginalized
gender outlaws. The point to stress is that only after embracing this
imperative can we construct a responsive transformative law.
While some gender advocates are unwilling to imagine future law, others
over-theorize their ideas. I am particularly interested in Andrew Gilden’s
recent article on transformative gender law.44 While I believe that Gilden
provides incisive critiques on gender regulation, I am very concerned about
his condemnation of transgender clients and their advocates who are
litigating equal protection, Title VII, and other claims because he believes
that litigation of this kind reinforces the binary gender paradigm by failing
to challenge prevailing gender norms in the law. I think that we can accept
his critical critiques, and, with them, we can ground a tangible law-making
strategy that does not demonize victimized transgender people who seek
legal relief.

43. See Richael Faithful, Transitioning Our Prisons Toward Affirmative Law:
Examining the Impact of Gender Classification Policies on U.S. Transgender
Prisoners, 5 MOD. AM. 3, 3 (2009).
44. See generally Gilden, supra note 9.
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V. TRANSFORMATIVE GENDER LAW: THE UNIVERSAL SOLUTION?
How do we begin to shape the law to respond fairly to complex ways of
existing?
The formal equality critiques are well supported, whether from highprofile trans-advocates or gender post-modernists. It is a model that
responds well to civil rights-era politics but is virtually silent on individual
autonomy. As we reach the identity-protection ceiling, our choice is either
to break through to freedom or to break under equality.
Existing non-discrimination laws, anchored in formal equality principles,
suffer from three defects when examined against a criminalization
backdrop. First, as previously discussed, enumerated protections are too
narrow a sheath. Even with the addition of gender expression to some
laws, they remain less meaningful in combating intersectional
discrimination (the combinative effect of marginalization). Second, nondiscrimination laws are untenable in the long term. The District of
Columbia employment non-discrimination law exemplifies this problem.45
The law enumerates sixteen protected statuses including “gender identity
and expression.” I do not believe that the D.C. Code is over-inclusive, but
I cannot imagine how it could function with such a long list of
characteristics. Finally, non-discrimination laws will remain inherently
dangerous until equal protection analysis is altered or shifted. Wellmeaning parties are at risk of becoming litigants as long as neutral
construction is inverted to benefit well-off people to the detriment of the
law’s intended beneficiaries.46 These three concerns strongly compel us to
consider new options.
Andrew Gilden’s article envisions a system in which “legal rules may
potentially counter such traditions by eliminating their means of
perpetuation while simultaneously laying the foundations for a future that
embraces a broad range of gendered expression.”47 To do this, he suggests
that advocates must make a “conceptual shift” so that the law may
reinforce more positive gender norms.48
Gilden then proposes a
45. D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (2007) (defining characteristics including race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual
orientation, gender identity or expression, family responsibilities, genetic information,
disability, matriculation, and political affiliation).
46. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”:
The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 638-81 (2003) (arguing that the equal protection doctrine has been
inverted from its intended purpose due to the Court’s failure to contextualize equal
protection claims).
47. Gilden, supra note 9, at 117-18.
48. Id. at 118.
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comparison to other gender-fluid systems to guide the Western “legal
reconstructive project.”49 I hope that my previous points on criminalization
reinforce his core arguments; however, I wish to redirect his conclusion
that we are doomed until we change cultural norms around gender.
First, vigorous client advocacy and anti-essentialism50 advocacy are not
mutually exclusive work. Brilliant litigators consistently advance client
and community interests, although, admittedly, it is extremely difficult to
do. It is a strategy in which inexperienced advocates should not necessarily
engage.51 Gilden seems to argue that any “non-progressive” advocacy
(advocacy that does not challenge gendered assumptions) is harmful
because it reinforces the current legal regime. He categorically rejects such
a “short-term strategy” that further entrenches gender norms.52 I qualify his
point to mean this: we should encourage experienced advocates to engage
in creative, effective, progressive lawyering that advances client and
community interests. I defer to skilled practitioners for specific thoughts
on this issue. Activists, in the meantime, can employ new law-making
strategies.
Second, formal equality critiques that condemn any “non-progressive”
approaches are not very helpful. Politics is not a zero-sum game. In other
words, shaping our current reality does not resign us to the status quo;
rather, it can offer wisdom to be used toward our present strategy as we
fulfill our transformative vision. I urge gender-justice supporters not to shy
away from post-identity critiques because alternatives seem unpalatable—
alternatives, after all, should seem like a stretch. Instead, we should view
critiques as insights into our possible future. So, where do we go from
here?
Martha Fineman’s vulnerability thesis is a useful framework for the
transformative gender law discussion.53 The vulnerability thesis envisions

49. Id. at 120.
50. Anti-essentialism in this context means advocacy that is not restricted to

normative gender binary understandings within the law. For example, a domestic
violence lawyer who has a non-gender identified client is practicing “anti-essentialism”
by using gender neutral pronouns and by resisting attempts to impose a normative
gender marker (male, female, transgender) on the client. This practice strategy is
increasingly common. See Morgan Lynn, The Last Thing Hanging in the Closet:
LGBT Intimate Partner Violence, Remarks at the National LGBT Bar Association
Career Fair and Conference 2009 (Sept. 11, 2009).
51. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Social Justice Movements and LatCrit Community:
On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L.
REV. 629, 653-61 (2002) (arguing that in some cases, anti-essentialist arguments have
limited effectiveness and continue to be risky propositions).
52. Gilden, supra note 9, at 112-16.
53. See generally Fineman, supra note 13. Fineman’s vulnerable subject is a
revised theory from the dependent subject featured in her previous work, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004).
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the development of political and legal institutions on a “comprehensive
vision of the human experience.”54 Fineman argues that vulnerability is a
variable condition based on human realities and that societal institutions,
designed to “lessen[,] . . . ameliorate[,] . . . and compensate . . . for
vulnerability,” should be responsive to these realities.55 Most convincing
about Fineman’s work is its implicit anticipation that international models
will finally penetrate United States jurisprudence.56 Her model predicts
and utilizes constructive cultural and legal trends.
A positive, nexus-based civil rights model diverges from a formal
equality model in three important ways. First, it assumes gender difference
rather than gender conformity. The absence of a gender imperative
necessarily diminishes its regulation. Second, a vulnerability model
reverses the long-standing presumption that all discrimination is benign
unless proven otherwise. Such a presumption for a state protection is
consistent with a vulnerability thesis, and it is reasonable in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment.57 Third, a nexus-based civil rights model shifts
the discriminatory landscape from one that is dominated by a state
intervener to one that includes a state protector. A state protector
obligation provides a venue in which systemic oppression of all kinds can
be seriously challenged, rather than ignored by the law. Change is
inevitable, a new model is necessary, and the vulnerability model holds
distinct promise.
A positive, nexus-based model is also more likely to be responsive to
gender criminalization.
Ancillary criminalization is constitutionally
suspect due to its disparate impact on gender variant people. Systemic

54. Fineman, supra note 13, at 10.
55. Id. at 12-13.
56. See id. at 15 n.42 (pointing to international treaties as a model for collective

asset provision). Fineman subtly juxtaposes the U.S., negative-right equality scheme to
international and other nation-state positive-state models throughout to demonstrate
alternative nation-state models for ensuring social rights and benefits, which Fineman
describes as “assets.” Although she never explicitly argues for safety net policies like
those in European nations, the responsive state model for which she advocates is, in
part, an argument for European-like economic safety net policies.
57. See Hutchinson, supra note 46, at 617. Hutchinson explains the constitutional
dimensions as follows:
Despite these critiques, which contest the granting of enhanced judicial
solicitude exclusively to vulnerable classes, no scholar has argued that the
Court should construe the Equal Protection Clause as guaranteeing judicial
solicitude exclusively or primarily for the discrimination claims brought by
powerful social classes and that the discrimination claims of vulnerable groups
should normally enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. In fact, most
scholars and jurists would likely dismiss this argument as utterly inconsistent
with the historical context surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment, the
intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the judicial
elaboration of the meaning of equality.
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criminalization is interrupted as the government adopts a protector
obligation and provides more robust safety nets. More universalized
healthcare, for instance, is a safety net that would immensely benefit
marginalized gender variant people on the whole. Equally important, a
more responsive legal regime opens the floodgates of accountability from
lawmakers to police. Decision-makers will be on notice that their behavior
will be scrutinized if it deviates from fundamental nexus principles. A new
model cannot eliminate discrimination or its deeply-rooted systemic
effects, but it can ameliorate a political climate that has tolerated it for far
too long.
The equal protection model and vulnerability model fail, however, if the
general discrimination argument is lost. The success of any model is
contingent on justice-minded people creating conditions in which not only
is all discrimination suspect, but all discrimination is not treated the same
under the law. The simple fact is that denying a job to a gender variant
person because ze58 “doesn’t look right” is distinct from denying a gendernormative person the same job because ze is the least preferred candidate.
Donald Lively and Stephen Plass contend that the formal equality regime is
the result of competing governing values, not the result of a desire to end
discrimination.59 If we were to settle the values debate and re-orient equal
protection toward justice rather than sameness, we would have an
opportunity to address marginalization at its core.60
The vulnerability model is at risk of inversion without a nuanced cultural
understanding of discrimination, rights, power, and vulnerability.61 But if
progressives and justice-activists can move the political environment, the
vulnerability model promises universal protection along with the flexibility
necessary to protect those likely to encounter situations that increase their
vulnerability. A true safety valve can exist in a new model with a proviso
that advocates continue to champion justice over equality.

58. “Ze” is a gender-neutral pronoun that is intended to be an alternative to “she”
or “he.” I intentionally used “ze” so as not to impose a gender identity onto the
hypothetical gender variant person in the discussion.
59. Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of
Denial and Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1310 (1991).
60. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 107, 108 (1976) (proposing that the Equal Protection Clause itself retains no
cognizable meaning, which has led to the development of a “mediating” value known
as the antidiscrimination principle). Assuming that the analysis is true, the mediating
equal protection principle may be replaced or re-conceived.
61. See generally Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997)
(arguing that the inverted formal equality regime, which she calls the entrenched
system of status regulation, is poised to change its rhetoric, but also to continue its
impact of deepening inequality).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Local non-discrimination laws are the seeds of a transformative gender
law movement. Community organizers, who assess conditions and
calibrate options, should consider pushing a positive, nexus-based,
vulnerability-inspired, non-discrimination agenda for legal reform. We can
pursue long-term strategies, such as packing the high Court with leftists
who wish to reform the equal protection doctrine or building a
congressional bloc with the political will to make new laws. However, we
can also take risks at the local level. Local politics are the laboratory for
radical re-imagination and for community members to make enduring
change.62 Communities can move to see whether this vision is possible at
all, and if it is, they can reshape that vision to best deliver justice.
Transforming the equal protection regime does not eliminate gender
regulation; rather, it significantly weakens it. The vulnerability model
speaks to our longing for a just legal regime, one that presumes difference,
considers context, and responds to fairness. This transformative vision is
possible if scholars re-focus their analysis on gender outsiders who every
day resist injustice, and away from the Court’s equal opportunity myth.63
I invite any person into the transformative gender law discussion who is
invested in long-term gender-justice. We will need insights from activists,
advocates, scholars, and gender variant community members themselves to
shape the political climate, contextualize the legal debate, and experiment
with law-making options. As the formal equality regime gasps its final
breaths, new ideas are rising to the surface. To borrow from a great justicethinker, Cornel West, we risk our democratic maturation if we are unable to
comfort the nihilism that has engulfed our modern politics.64 To delve into
our imperialist legacy is to unleash our democratic energies of “Socratic
questioning, prophetic witness[ing], and tragicomic hope.”65 This idea
embodies transformative gender law’s purpose, which contemplates high
stakes for a legal, social, as well as a moral future.

62. See generally KRISTIN LAYNG SZAKOS & JOE SZAKOS, WE MAKE CHANGE:
COMMUNITY ORGANIZERS TALK ABOUT WHAT THEY DO—AND WHY (2007)
(documenting organizers who state that long-term, sustainable change is made by
community members at the local level).
63. See Siegel, supra note 61, at 1135 (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
“modern equal protection opinions have created . . . a culture that now embraces ‘equal
opportunity’ and ‘nondiscrimination’ as a form of civic religion”).
64. CORNEL WEST, DEMOCRACY MATTERS: WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST
IMPERIALISM 41 (2004).
65. Id.
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